

REPORT 11/2024

Expectations and disillusionment with climate financing in the Democratic Republic of Congo

EBUTELI

Congo Research Group | Groupe d'Étude sur le Congo

Center on International Cooperation
NYU | ARTS & SCIENCE

Ebuteli is a Congolese research institute covering politics, governance and violence. Ebuteli ("staircase", in Lingala) has made it its mission to promote, through rigorous research, an informed debate to find solutions to the many challenges facing the DRC. In an environment very often clouded by easy-to-spread rumours, Ebuteli hopes its work will contribute to constructive discussions on issues of great national importance.

All our publications, blogs and podcasts are available at: https://www.ebuteli.org

The Congo Research Group (CRG) was founded in 2015 to promote rigorous, independent research into the violence that affects millions of Congolese. This requires a broad approach. For us, the roots of this violence can be found in a history of predatory governance that dates back to the colonial period and that connects the hillsides of the Kivus with political intrigue and corruption in Kinshasa, as well as in the capitals of Europe, China, and North America. Today, CRG's research aims to explain the complicated interplay among politics, violence, and political economy in the Congo to a wide audience

https://www.congoresearchgroup.org/en/

Cover Photo:
A large Irico tree (Chlorophora excelsa) is felled by traditional loggers in less than an hour using a chainsaw.

Credits: **Flickr/United Nations Environment Programme Disasters & Conflicts Sub-Programme.**

This report was produced thanks to funding from the European Instrument for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Congo Research Group and Ebuteli, its research partner in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union or Sweden.

Contents

Glossary

CAFI	Central African Forest Initiative
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
NDC	Nationally determined contribution
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Fonaredd	Fonds national REDD+ (REDD+ National Fund)
CRG	Congo Research Group
IGF	Inspectorate of Finance
Medd	Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development
ND-GAIN	Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
Redd+Reducing	Emissions from deforestation and forest degradation through sustainable forest management, conservation and enhancement of forest carbon stocks
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo

Executive Summary

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has many assets that make it a key player in the fight against climate change. On the one hand, the DRC possesses many strategic minerals needed for the energy transition (copper, cobalt, lithium, etc.), and on the other, the country is home to vast swathes of tropical forest (60% of the Congo Basin's tropical forests). The DRC is also home to a number of wetlands, including the world's largest tropical peatland complex, covering some 123,750 km^2, or 75% of the Congo Basin. These forests and peatlands are invaluable in the battle against global warming, hence the importance of their preservation. But at the same time, the DRC's ecosystems are brimming with other natural resources that could potentially fuel the country's growth and development. For example, the DRC is rich in oil, which could generate revenue and create jobs. Despite being one of the world's poorest and most climate-vulnerable countries, the preservation of the DRC's forests and peatlands carries an economic and social cost. In regions rich with these resources, the Congolese government could potentially develop not only the forestry industry but also hydrocarbon sector to boost public revenues and maintain economic growth.

In 2022, developed countries finally mobilized nearly USD 116 billion to assist developing countries in funding climate adaptation decarbonization programs. Despite the DRC's significant contribution to global warming mitigation through its forests and peatlands, it remains a relative underachiever in terms of climate financing. Fonaredd, which was set up in 2012 to channel donor support, has only managed to mobilize USD 750 million, including a recent USD 500 million pledge from the CAFI fund.

This report highlights the fact that the lack of climate financing in the DRC, combined with the opposition of some donors to logging and oil exploitation, is fueling accusations in national opinion of an international plot against the Congolese state, the "victim" of an unequal exchange. Without financial compensation that meets Congolese expectations, it will be difficult to achieve national ownership of forest and peatland preservation initiatives.

Introduction

Global climate changes necessitate urgent national, regional and international policies to address this pressing planetary challenge through dual-pronged mitigation and adaptation strategies. On the one hand, mitigation efforts aim to combat the causes of global warming, and on the other, adaptation measures seek to overcome or reduce its effects, such as extreme flooding, water scarcity, and desertification.

The DRC possesses significant assets that position it as a crucial player in the fight against climate change, which is attracting ever-increasing interest from the international community. On the one hand, the DRC possesses many strategic minerals essential for the energy transition, including copper, cobalt, and lithium. On the other hand, it holds 60% of the Congo Basin rainforest, now recognized as "the world's largest carbon sink, absorbing more carbon than the Amazon."[1] Hence the importance of preserving this forest to mitigate the effects of climate change.

The DRC envisions a green, resilient, low-carbon economy to combat climate change.[2] It prioritizes the rational and sustainable management of its strategic natural resources to ensure ecological balance and the social, economic, cultural and environmental well-being of its population. The DRC is committed to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.

Despite the DRC's abundant natural resources which are crucial for addressing climate change, it has yet to secure substantial climate financing. Studies conducted for the nationally determined contribution (NDC)[3] estimate the country's climate change needs for 2020-2030 at USD 48.68 billion,[4] averaging approximately USD 4.8 billion annually. However, the expected international financial flows fall far short of the DRC's requirements. To illustrate this, the Fonaredd,[5] set up in 2012 to channel donor support, has only been able to mobilize USD 750 million, including the latest financing under the second letter of intent signed with the CAFI fund for USD 500 million.

In a previous report on Fonaredd, Ebuteli examined the institutional constraints and governance challenges hindering the DRC's access to climate financing, despite the fact that it is one of the world's most vulnerable countries (ranked fifth worldwide).[5] Given these unmet expectations, this report highlights the lack of climate financing, coupled with donor opposition to logging and oil exploitation, as fueling accusations of an international conspiracy against the Congolese state—a "victim" of an unequal exchange. Without financial compensation that meets the country's needs in the fight against climate change, it is inconceivable that there will be any real national ownership of international initiatives to preserve forests and peatlands.

Regarding the methodology, the research conducted from May 2021 to July 2024 relied on documentary analysis, semi-structured interviews (67), focus groups (4), and a public forum held in Kinshasa. The first part of this report presents an overview of the DRC's climate profile. It not only explores the country's potential for combating climate change, but also examines the issue of the country's vulnerability to this phenomenon, and highlights its financing needs. The second part focuses on the reasons low climate mobilization for the DRC, beginning with an examination of the country's institutional weaknesses and followed by a brief discussion of global financing architecture challenges. The third and final part of the report addresses the Congolese government's demands for financial compensation from polluting countries.

I. Climate profile of the DRC: potential, vulnerability and financial needs

1.1. The DRC as a "solution country" to climate change

At COP26[6] held in Glasgow in November 2021, President Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi presented the DRC as a "solution country"[7] to climate change, highlighting the country's abundant resources that position it at the forefront of global effort to mitigate climate change.

Firstly, the DRC's mining potential is crucial for the global energy transition, with over 60% of the world's cobalt reserves, 10% of its copper reserves, and significant quantities of coltan, lithium, nickel and germanium—all of which are vital to this transition. The control of these strategic minerals is currently fueling competition between China and the United States of America.

Secondly, the DRC has a vast forest heritage, representing 10% of the world's tropical forest reserves, including almost 50% of Africa's dense forests and 60% of the Congo Basin's tropical forests. With a carbon absorption capacity exceeding that of the Amazon rainforest,[8] estimated at almost 1.5 billion tonnes of carbon per year, the DRC's forests are crucial for mitigating climate change.[9] Additionally, the DRC is home to wetlands, including the largest tropical peatland complex, capable of storing "between 26 and 32 billion tonnes of carbon, equivalent to three years of global fossil fuel emissions. The central Congo Basin is home to 36% of the world's tropical peatlands,"[10] and recent discoveries have revealed significant peatlands in the mangrove zone of the Kongo Central province, covering an area of 66,000 hectorates.[11]

Thirdly, from an emissions point of view, the DRC is a net-negative carbon emitter, and can absorb two-thirds of all Africa's carbon emissions.[12] According to a World Bank study, "the DRC's forest cover has a significant impact on global and national ecosystem services. The DRC's forests can generate an estimated value of between USD 223 billion and USD 398 billion per year through stored carbon and associated ecosystem services."[13]

Given this potential, the DRC has a number of opportunities to play a leading role in the fight against global warming. However, it is also one of the countries most vulnerable to the effects of climate change.

1.2. DRC's vulnerabilities to climate change

Despite the assets mentioned above, the DRC is one of the countries most vulnerable to climate change and least prepared to deal with it. According to the National Climate Change Adaptation Plan (2022-2026), the country "ranks 5th globally in the ND-GAIN index of countries most vulnerable to climate change in terms of their adaptive capacity."[14] The plan notes that "the effects of climate change are already perceptible across the country, including persistent heat, violent rains, land degradation, particularly through erosion, disrupted seasons, increased droughts during rainy seasons, and flooding."[15]
In Kinshasa, the DRC's largest city, a World Bank study found that torrential rains cost households around USD 1.2 million due to disruption of public transport and damage to infrastructure.[16] Excessive rainfall is feared to exacerbate flooding, land erosion, and landslides. Environmental and climate reports[17] confirm that the DRC will face more climate disruptions, such as drought during rainy seasons and shorter rainy periods. Southern regions may experience higher temperatures by the century's end. These forecasts are particularly concerning given the Congolese state's structural fragility.

Climate change also indirectly impacts food security, particularly for households dependent on rudimentary rain-fed agriculture. As agriculture is the primary source of livelihood for 70% of the DRC's population, the FAO's[18] warning that nearly a quarter of the population remains acutely food insecure highlights the significant threat posed by global warming to the majority of the population.[19]

In the Congolese context, climate change also raises concerns due to the state's limited capacity to protect the national territory. The proliferation of the Mbororo phenomenon in the northeast, especially in the Haut-Uele province, suggests that these changes may accentuate insecurity in certain regions of the DRC.

In summary, the DRC'S high level of vulnerability to climate change underscores the urgent need to mobilize substantial capital to develop and implement mitigation and adaptation policies commensurate with the challenges. Such mobilization remains an absolute national priority to address the needs of the most disadvantaged populations who are disproportionately affected by the adverse effects of climate change.

1.3. DRC's financial requirements for climate actions

Under the Paris Agreement adopted at COP21, each state is responsible for developing its NDC, a plan outlining climate actions to reduce emissions and adapt to climate change effects.

The DRC's revised NDC for 2021-2030 combines mitigation and adaptation objectives, focusing on accelerating forestry and land reforms, national land-use planning, and poverty reduction. The country aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 21% by 2030.

Implementing this NDC requires mobilizing USD 48.68 billion distributed as follows: USD 25.60 billion for mitigation initiatives and USD 23.08 billion for priority adaptation measures.[20] The DRC's climate actions under the NDC prioritize the most vulnerable sectors, including forest protection and management, climate-resilient agriculture, coastal zone conservation, integrated water resource management, improved health systems, and the transition to clean, renewable energy sources (see the figure below).

Figure 1. Components of the DRC's climate financing needs

Financial needs for adaptation (In billions of USD)



Financial needs for mitigation (In billions of USD)



Source: Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, "Revised Nationally Determined Contribution," UNFCCC, October 2021, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2022-06/CDN%20Revis%C3%A9e%20 de%20la%20RDC.pdf, accessed 2 July 2023, 10–19.

While the DRC produces almost no emissions, the NDC allocates a larger share to mitigation. Given the country's under-industrialized state, preserving Congolese forests and peatlands, considered to be one of the lungs of the planet, is a crucial priority.

The financial aspects of the DRC's revised NDC raise two significant observations. First, the country's climate commitment far exceeds its self-financing capabilities. Second, beyond budgetary constraints, the DRC faces multiple competing priorities for its modest national resources (security, health, education, public infrastructure, civil servants' salaries, etc.). In this context, the DRC must diversify its climate financing sources. However, the country lacks competitiveness in this field.

II. DRC's lack of attractiveness for climate financing

Developing countries, particularly sub-Saharan Africa, face a mismatch between climate investment needs and available public resources. Before examining the specific case of the DRC, it is essential to provide a general overview of climate financing in developing countries.

2.1. Overview of climate financing: donor preference for mitigation

Since 2009, rich countries (polluters) have pledged, in the name of climate justice, to mobilize USD 100 billion annually to help poor countries combat global warming. According to the OECD, developed countries have exceeded this commitment, mobilizing USD 115.9 billion by 2022.

Table 1. Climate financing from developed to developing countries

Cumulative data from 2016 to 2022 (in billions of US dollars)

Section	Years						
	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Bilateral financing	28.0	27.0	32.0	28.7	31.4	34.5	41.0
Multilateral financing	18.9	27.2	30.5	34.7	36.9	38.7	50.6
Export credits[21]	1.5	3.0	2.7	2.6	1.9	2.1	2.4
Private financing	10.1	14.5	14.7	14.4	13.1	14.4	21.9
Total	58.5	71.7	79.9	80.4	83.3	89.7	115.9

Source: OECD (2024). Climate finance provided and mobilized by developed countries in 2013-2022, p 6.

However, these figures have been criticized. Oxfam points out that accounting and reporting practices used by climate financing don't accurately reflect the actual level of support provided. For example, in 2020, Oxfam estimated the real value of financial support for climate action at only USD 21-24.5 billion, far less than official figures suggest.[21] In 2022, Oxfam noted that this real value was between USD 28 and USD 35 billion.[22] Unfortunately, the OECD's aggregate data do not provide information on the distribution of funds among recipient developing countries, leading to arguments from these countries contesting bilateral and multilateral donor contributions.

When allocating climate finance, donors tend to favor mitigation efforts. This funding is more readily available to newly industrialized countries, where foreign direct investment (FDI) from developed countries is also concentrated (China, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Argentina, South Africa, etc.).

Figure 2: Breakdown of climate financing according to mitigation and adaptation objectives (in billions of USD)



Source: OECD (2024). Climate finance provided and mobilized by developed countries in 2013-2022, p 10.

For example, by November 2022, Indonesia had secured USD 20 billion in funding pledges from international institutions and wealthy countries, including the US, the UK, Canada, and France. This financial support aims to help Indonesia achieve its goal of carbon neutrality by 2050. Similarly, at COP27, Germany, the UK, the US, and the European Union reiterated pledges of USD 8.5 billion to South Africa.

While climate financing for least developed countries has grown significantly, reaching USD 20 billion in 2022 for the first time,[23] the DRC, despite its reputation as a "global warming solution country," receives only modest allocations. The Fonaredd has mobilized only USD 750 million from CAFI, with additional funding from certain donors outside of CAFI or Fonaredd (United States, France, World Bank, etc.). The dispersal of these interventions always raises questions about aid coordination.

Congolese officials often express a sense of injustice regarding the DRC's limited climate financing. What are the main challenges to significantly increase climate financing for the DRC?

2.2. Structural challenges

While the DRC possesses abundant resources for combating climate change, these alone are insufficient to attract significant public or private climate financing. Key determinants include good governance, a favorable business climate, socio-economic and political stability, effective policy implementation, corruption control, and a transparent legal framework. Additionally, wealthy countries often prioritize mitigation financing and consider geopolitical factors when allocating climate funds. A developing country with a privileged economic or political partnership may receive substantial financing flows from major powers, as seen with Brazil and Indonesia, which also have significant forestry resources.

Despite its reputation as a global warming solution country, the DRC's lack of attractiveness stems primarily from institutional shortcomings, including corruption, lack of transparency and accountability, weak state authority, and political instability. This may explain why Fonaredd programs are implemented directly by United Nations agencies or bilateral cooperation agencies. Even with these reputable agencies involved, the DRC'S performance in mobilizing climate financing remains poor, reinforcing the theory of an international conspiracy.

As reported previously, at COP26 in Glasgow, the second letter of intent signed between CAFI and the DRC in November 2021 mobilized USD 500 million, primarily for implementing policies to protect Congolese forests. This funding, focused on creating enabling conditions for forest protection, falls short of Congolese expectations regarding adaptation challenges. It suggests a mismatch between donor support and national priorities, leading the DRC to seek unpredictable alternatives without commensurate financial compensation.

III. The Congolese government's response to the shortfall in financial compensation

In the absence of expected financial compensation from donors, the DRC seeks to increase public revenues through the exploitation of its forests and hydrocarbons to meet the needs of its citizens. However, the DRC's heavy dependence on wealthy countries gives these nations significant influence over the Congolese government's decisions.

3.1. Lifting the moratorium on forestry allocations

By mutual agreement with donors, the Congolese government suspended the granting of forest allocations in May 2002. Lifting this moratorium required three conditions: *1)* publication of new forest allocation rules, *2)* publication of the final results of the conversion process, and *3)* adoption of a geographical programming of future allocations through a consultative process.

In May 2021, the Forestry Management Directorate urged the Minister of Environment and Sustainable Development, Eve Bazaiba, to lift the moratorium, citing the fulfillment of the first two conditions.

This note to the minister mentioned the lack of political will to achieve the last condition, namely the geographical programming of future forest allocations under forest concessions. And yet, both proposals were on the table:

Complete the geographic programming process after preliminary delineation of potentially adjudicable forest areas at the national level. This would require six months and approximately USD 50,000.[25]

Conduct field checks and a more detailed definition of the area available for adjudication before completing the geographic programming process. This would take three years and cost USD 5 million.[25]

After waiting in vain for financial support from CAFI through FONAREDD to implement geographic programming, the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development concluded that donors were obstructing the process. The Congolese authorities continue to lament the DRC's status as the only country in the Congo Basin to maintain this moratorium.

3.2. Oil block auctions

Since July 2022, the Congolese government has issued tenders for hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation rights, encompassing 27 oil blocks and three gas blocks with estimated reserves of over USD 650 billion.[26] However, without in-depth exploration, the quantity and exploitability of these resources remain uncertain. This initiative has sparked controversy, as nine of these oil blocks are located in protected areas, including Virunga and Salonga parks and the central basin peat bogs. Non-governmental organizations, such as the Rainforest Foundation, oppose the project, arguing that oil and gas expansion in the Congo Basin poses an existential threat to the global climate, the world's second-largest rainforest, and thousands of communities.[27]

During a visit to Kinshasa, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressed concerns about these tenders, as some blocks cross peat bogs and protected areas. He noted that "we had concerns when we heard about these tenders. Some of these blocks cross peat bogs and protected areas such as Virunga Park. The DRC wants to remain the solution country when it comes to protecting the environment and biodiversity. We wanted to make sure that everything that has been envisaged can go ahead, but with environmental studies carried out beforehand, and that we don't go ahead with operations that harm the environment or compromise the DRC's role as a solution-country.[28]"

At the summit of the three basins of biodiversity ecosystems and tropical forests in Brazzaville from October 26-28, 2023, UNESCO approached Eve Bazaiba, the DRC's Minister of Environment and Sustainable Development, to inquire about the refusal to cancel oil concessions overlapping Salonga National Park, a World Heritage site. In February 2024, Eve Bazaiba's chief of staff responded that the blocs in question were not currently part of the tender process and therefore did not require immediate discussions with UNESCO.[29]

In its search for strategies to increase national revenues and address poverty and sustainable development challenges, the Congolese government feels that the international community often demands initiatives that do not primarily benefit the Congolese people. The curse of natural wealth is reflected in external interference in matters of state sovereignty. However, the DRC's economic and financial fragility places it in a dilemma when implementing government decisions, which are often poorly perceived by bilateral and multilateral donors. Seeking support from these same partners for official development assistance or lasting peace in eastern DRC, the Congolese government ultimately remains a prisoner of external pressures.

Conclusions and recommendations

For several decades now, the entire planet has been exposed to the multiple effects of climate change. Against this backdrop, the Democratic Republic of Congo is attracting a great deal of interest from the international community, given the mitigation role played by its forests and peatlands. In recent years, the DRC has set out its ambitions to establish itself as a solution to global warming. In particular, the country has pledged "to halt and reverse forest loss and land degradation by 2031, while ensuring sustainable development and promoting inclusive rural transformation."[30]

Despite its reputation as a "climate solution country," the DRC receives only small allocations. This poor performance in mobilizing climate financing presents the DRC with a dilemma.

Without financial compensation to match its expectations and real needs for combating climate change, the DRC is seeking alternative approaches. Like other developing countries, the DRC is currently relying on the exploitation of its forests and oil, which has led to various controversies.

For 22 years, the DRC has been under a moratorium on industrial logging concessions. Over the years, the Congolese government has failed to advocate for lifting this moratorium, resulting in a significant loss of revenue for the public treasury. Additionally, the international community opposes oil development in areas that threaten forests, peatlands, and protected areas like Virunga and Salonga National Parks. The Congolese government maintains that mining can be conducted responsibly with technology that integrates environmental and social concerns.

The shortfall in climate finance compensation, coupled with the opposition of donors in the above-mentioned areas, is fueling accusations of an international conspiracy against the Congolese state.

In order to achieve satisfactory results for all parties, we make the following recommendations:

1. Strengthening reforms to enable the DRC to significantly increase public and private climate financing. The Congolese government must focus on creating an environment conducive to transparent and efficient management of public finances. This requires the fight against corruption. In addition, it is essential to improve the business climate to attract private climate financing.

2. The lifting of the moratorium on forest concessions in the near future, while ensuring the restoration of the Congolese state's regulatory capacity, with which the DRC can rationalize the exploitation of its forest heritage. The involvement of local communities in the sustainable management of this heritage also deserves particular attention. We could envisage responsible taxation of logging royalties for these communities.

3. Support from technical and financial partners for the Congolese government's oil development projects, under conditions that guarantee the protection of the environment and biodiversity.

4. Diversification of the Congolese economy, with the emphasis on a processing industry geared towards the energy transition and capable of absorbing a large part of the agricultural workforce.

5. Periodic studies of climate services and deforestation rates in the DRC. While it is legitimate for the Congolese government to demand financial compensation, it must also be able to demonstrate that it is succeeding in meeting its international commitments.

Endnotes

1. News, "World Bank - Journey to the Congo Basin - The lungs of Africa and the beating heart of the world," *Banque Mondiale*, October 24, 2022, accessed March 11, 2024, https://www.banquemondiale.org/fr/news/feature/2022/10/24/journey-into-the-congo-basin-the-lungs-of-africa-and-beating-heart-of-the-world#:~:text=Connu%20comme%20le%20%C2%AB%20poumon%20de,de%20carbone%20que%20l'Amazonie.

2. Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, "Revised Nationally Determined Contribution," *UNFCCC*, October 2021, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2022-06/CDN%20Revis%C3%A9e%20 de%20la%20RDC.pdf, accessed 2 July 2023, p 8.

3. "Revised Nationally Determined Contribution - DRC," *UNFCCC*, 2022, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2022-06/CDN%20Revis%C3%A9e%20de%20la%20 DRC.pdf, consulted on October 4, 2023.

4. Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, "National Climate Change Adaptation Plan (2022-2026)," *UNFCCC*, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/DRC-NAP_FRENCH.pdf, consulted on November 10, 2023.

5. National fund to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.

6. Report, "Fonaredd faces the challenges of climate finance and governance in the DRC," *Ebuteli*, July 9, 2024, https://www.ebuteli.org/publications/rapports/le-fonaredd-face-aux-defis-du-financement-climatique-et-de-la-gouvernance-en-rdc, accessed November 10, 2022.

7. Auguy Mudiayi, "COP26: Félix Tshisekedi insisted that "the DRC is a solution country" for the climate crisis," *Actualité.cd*, 2 November 2021, https://actualite.cd/2021/11/02/cop26-felix-tshisekedi-insiste-que-la-rdc-est-pays-solution-la-crise-climatique, accessed 12 July 2023.

8. Laurence Alexandrowicz, "DRC: a "solution country" for the planet and Congolese farmers," *Euronews*, 8 November 2021, https://fr.euronews.com/2021/11/08/rdc-un-pays-solution-pour-la-planete-et-les-fermiers-congolais, accessed 12 July 2023.

9. UN Environment Programme, "Critical ecosystems: Congo Basin peatlands," *UNEP*, 27 February 2023, https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/critical-ecosystems-congo-basin-peatlands, accessed 8 June 2024.

10. News, "The world's largest tropical peatland is in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *Africa Museum*, https://www.africamuseum.be/fr/research/news/the-worlds-largest-tropical-peatland-is-in-the-DRC, accessed 18 September 2024.

11. Tshimanga, Bisa, Bola et Bolalwembe, "Étude multisectorielle sur les tourbières de la République démocratique du Congo," *CRREBaC*.

12. Solo Zerbo and Megan Pohl, "Multi-sectoral study on peatlands in the Democratic Republic of Congo," in "Democratic Republic of the Congo: Selected Issues," *International Monetary Funds*, July 2022, https://doi.org/10.5089/9798400214288.002, accessed July 2, 2023, p. 3.

13. Press Release, "To Become a Climate Solutions Country, the Democratic Republic of Congo Must Strengthen its Institutions and Increase Investments," *World Bank*, November 16, 2023, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/11/15/a-climate-solutions-country-afe-1123-democratic-republic-of-congo-institutions, accessed May 10, 2024.

14. Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, "National Climate Change Adaptation Plan (2022-2026)."

15. Ibid., p. 41.

16. World Bank, "To Become a Climate Solutions Country."

17. German Council on Foreign Relations, “Climate and Environmental Security in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Competing over Abundant Resources – Adapting to Change,” April 2023, https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/climate -and-environmental-security-democratic-republic-congo, accessed July 2, 2023. Climate Change Knowledge Portal, "Climate Risk Profile: Congo, Democratic Republic," World Bank, 2021, https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/country/congo-dem-rep/vulnerability, accessed July 2, 2023

18. Joint FAO/WFP News Release, “Almost a quarter of the population in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to face acute food insecurity as humanitarian needs grow to record levels,” *FAO Regional Office for Africa*, September 29, 2023, https://www.fao.org/newsroom/detail/almost-a-quarter-of-the-population-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-continue-to-face-acute-food-insecurity-as-humanitarian-needs-grow-to-r-ecord-levels/en, consulted on July 14, 2024.

19. Ibid.

20. Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, "Revised Nationally Determined Contribution,” *UNFCCC*, October 2021, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2022-06/CDN%20Revis%C3%A9e%20de%20la%20RDC.pdf, accessed July 2, 2023, p 9.

21. Report, "2023: the real figures on climate finance. Assessing compliance with the $100 billion commitment,” *Oxfam*, 2023, https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/621500/bp-climate-finance-shadow-report-050623-summ-fr.USApdf?sequence=3, accessed on September 26, 2023.

22. Press Release, “Rich countries overestimate ‘true value’ of climate finance by nearly $88 billion, Oxfam warns,” *Oxfam*, July 9, 2024, https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/rich-countries-overstating-true-value-climate-finance-88-billion-says-oxfam, accessed March 8, 2024.

23. Report, “Climate finance provided and mobilised by developed countries in 2013-2022,” *OECD*, May 29, 2024, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/climate-finance-provided-and-mobilised-by-developed-countries-in-2013-2022_19150727-en.html, p. 19.

24. General Directorate of Forests, Aide-mémoire of May 3, 2021, addressed to Her Excellency Madam Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of the Environment and Sustainable Development.

25. Ibid.

26. News, “Oil blocks affair: for the USA, exploitations must not compromise the role of the DRC as a “Solution Country,”” *Desk Nature*, August 10, 2022, https://desknature.com/index.php/2022/08/10/affaire-blocs-petroliers-pour-les-usa-les-exploitations-ne-doivent-pas-compromettre-le, accessed July 11, 2023.

27. Rainforest Foundation UK, “Congo in the Crosshairs: The Threats to Climate, Forests and Communities from Oil and Gas Expansion,” November 2022, www.rainforestfoundationuk.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Congo-in-the-Crosshairs-Report-EN.pdf, accessed 2 October 2023.

28. News, “Oil blocks affair.”

29. Letter No. 013/CAB/MINETAT/MIN-EDD/DIRCAB/TWBD/03/2024.

30. CAFI, “Annual Review Report 2023,” https://www.cafi.org/sites/default/files/2024-07/Rapport%20Revue%20Annuelle%20 Partenariat%20CAFI-RDC%202023.pdf, accessed February 8, 2024.

L’ensemble de nos publications, blogs et podcasts sont disponibles sur www.ebuteli.org

Ebuteli
1 Av de la paix, Kinshasa, Gombe
@ebuteli

www.ebuteli.org

Congo Research Group/Center on International Cooperation at New York University

777 United Nations Plaza, 8th Fl. New York, NY 10017, United States.

www.congoresearchgroup.org / www.cic.nyu.edu